Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief

Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21 (2010)
Abstract
The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790903318524
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
Why We Reason the Way We Do.Nishi Shah - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.
Belief Norms and Blindspots.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.
Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism About Content.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):48-58.

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