Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21 (2010)
The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Citations of this work BETA
Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism About Content.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):48-58.
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