Wittgenstein's Nonsense Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment

In Michael Campbell & Michael O’Sullivan (eds.), Wittgenstein and Perception. Routledge. pp. 126-151 (2015)
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Abstract

I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.

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José L. Zalabardo
University College London

References found in this work

The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Cambridge, England: Allen & Unwin.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Bertrand Russell - 1940 - Open Court. Edited by David Pears.

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