Erkenntnis 59 (3):285 - 290 (2003)

Nick Zangwill
University College London
Response-dependent theories of morality are currently popular. I suspect that this is because they combine ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ elements in an appealing way. Such theories seem to do justice to the idea that morality is out there to be known, at the same time as connecting moral judgements with our affective and motivational states. However, I shall argue that all response-dependent theories of morality are irretrievably flawed.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1026004412151
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Moral Anti-Realism.Richard Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Rönnedal - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):79-98.

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