Synthese 106 (1):67-101 (1996)
I defend the view that strong psychophysical superveniences is necessary and sufficient to explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. I employ factual and counterfactual conditionals as defeasible criteria of causal efficacy. And I also deal with certain problems arising from disjunctive and conjunctive properties
|Keywords||Causation Epistemology Logic Mental Supervenience|
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References found in this work BETA
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.R. Mele Alfred - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation.Nick Zangwill - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):253–289.
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