In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-27 (2008)
What is the relation between moral and natural properties? And how do we conceive of this relation? By ‘moral’ properties I will mean properties such as being evil, just or virtuous or having duties or rights; and by ‘natural’ properties I will mean properties such as psychological, sociological and physical properties.1 Suppose we judge that Queen Isabella of Spain was evil in 1492, or at least that many of her actions in 1492 were evil. Then we do not think that she had various natural properties in 1492 such as being a torturer, a bigot and desiring other’s pain and by an astounding coincidence she or her actions also had the moral property of evil. Rather, we think that she or her..
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How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong (Without Using Substantive Moral Premises).Christian Coons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83–98.
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