Reply to Nathan on Art

Abstract
I very much appreciate Daniel Nathan’s thoughtful commentary on Aesthe- tic Creation. He describes my view accurately, with a full understanding of what is moving me, and with some sympathy for my methodological concerns, even if he thinks that I over emphasize some desiderata and even if he cannot endorse the particular aesthetic theory that I argue emerges from the methodological reflections. He makes a number of interesting criticisms. (A) Nathan worries about doodles being classified as art according the aesthetic creation theory. Nathan says that this violates certain intuitions about the nature of art. I query this appeal to intuition. Whose concepts? Which intuitions? Why do such intuitions have evidential weight? We have intuitions abut the physical world: that the earth is flat not round. More to the point we have intuitions about kinds. For example, it is intuitive that a whale is a fish. But such intuitions may be mistaken. Similarly with intuitions about what is art and what is not art. With intuitions I say at least that there is, or should be, a question mark standing over them. We are interested in the world, not in our concepts or intuitions. The question is: what are these things? And the question about concepts is: which do we need to understand the things? Which concepts should we have? Not: which do we have? As Nathan notes, for me, explanation trumps extension if there is a conflict. Or perhaps rather, for me, extension is subsumed under explanation. It is true that there are avant garde works that I exclude that other theories include. And there also are doodles that I include and they exclude. The question is where we go from there. (B) Nathan worries about the success condition. I required that to some extent artists are right about aesthetic/nonaesthetic dependencies. Actually, I would not kill for the success condition. Perhaps aesthetic intent is enough1. A person might form an aesthetic intention but never get round to acting on it, in which case we do not have a work of art..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,174
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions.James McBain - 1999 - Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):197-204.
Aesthetic Creationby Zangwill, Nick.Daniel O. Nathan - 2008 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (4):416-418.
Are There Counterexamples to Aesthetic Theories of Art?Nick Zangwill - 2002 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (2):111–118.
Against the Sociology of Art.Nick Zangwill - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2):206-218.
Intuitions and Relativity.Kirk Ludwig - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445.
Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
The Artistic and the Aesthetic.Graham McFee - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (4):368-387.
Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?Janet Levin - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):253 – 269.
A Portrait of the Artist as an Aesthetic Expert.Christy Mag Uidhir & Cameron Buckner - 2014 - In Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran & Aaron Meskin (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
Intuitions in Linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
Added to PP index
2011-01-21

Total downloads
136 ( #35,721 of 2,180,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #15,907 of 2,180,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums