Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):309-319 (2012)

Authors
Elia Zardini
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
A new semantic paradox developed by Richard Heck and relying on very minimal logical and truth-theoretic resources is rehearsed. A theory of truth restricting the structural metarule of contraction is presented and some of the theory's relevant features are made explicit. It is then shown how the theory provides a principled solution to the paradox while preserving the extremely compelling truth-theoretic principles at stake, thus bringing out a significant advantage that the theory enjoys over virtually all other non-dialetheic theories. It is finally argued that such advantage is amplified by theoretical considerations made available by the adoption of a correspondentist perspective in the philosophy of truth
Keywords law of non‐contradiction  correspondentism  conjunction  semantic paradoxes  contraction
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.51
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Truth Without Contra(di)Ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties.Elia Zardini - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):351-384.
Restriction by Noncontraction.Elia Zardini - 2016 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (2):287-327.
The Opacity of Truth.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):37-54.

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