Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (2):287-327 (2016)

Authors
Elia Zardini
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds.
Keywords analetheism   contraction   dialetheism   naive truth   restricted quantification   substructural logics   transitivity
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DOI 10.1215/00294527-3429057
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language.John Barwise & Robin Cooper - 1981 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (2):159--219.
On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):219--61.
Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language.Jon Barwise - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4:159.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties.Elia Zardini - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):351-384.
Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes.Bruno Da Ré & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):611-629.
The Opacity of Truth.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):37-54.
Logical Predictivism.Ben Martin & Ole Hjortland - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):285-318.

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