Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574 (2008)

Elia Zardini
Universidade de Lisboa
A notion of truth as applicable to events of assertoric use ( utterances ) of a sentence token is arguably presupposed and required by our evaluative practices of the use of language. The truth of an utterance seems clearly to depend on what the utterance says . This fundamental dependence seems in turn to be captured by the schema that, if an utterance u says that P , then u is true iff P . Such a schema may thus be thought to constitute a suitable basis for an adequate theory of utterance truth, so much so that it seems straightforwardly to avoid the problems arising from context dependence and the semantic paradoxes which notoriously beset theories of utterance truth based on a simple disquotational schema. The paper argues that appearances are deceptive in both cases. On the one hand, the schema cannot allow for plausible if not uncontroversial non-indexical forms of context dependence, arising from the possibility that what an utterance says can be the case or not relative to different situations and that the truth of an utterance u of a sentence φ arguably depends on the truth of φ at the situation "associated" with u . On the other hand, a quantified utterance-truth variation on the liar paradox shows that the schema entails some consequence φ and at the same time the untruth of any utterance of φ; moreover, a resilient quantified propositional variation on the contingent liar paradox is offered, which only relies on resources usually employed by theories of utterance truth based on the schema.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2008.00157.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,025
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Index, Context, and Content.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. pp. 79-100.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Truth Without Contra(di)Ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.
Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties.Elia Zardini - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):351-384.
Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
The Opacity of Truth.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):37-54.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
158 ( #64,878 of 2,439,471 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #167,855 of 2,439,471 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes