Authors
Elia Zardini
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle but that the overall view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper also argues, against the BHK semantics, for the non- constructive character of the demonstrations envisaged by semantic anti-realism, and contends that, in such setting, one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic loses all its force.Tras presentar el anti-realismo semántico y la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo ofrece una reconstrucción del argumento anti-realista basado en la comprensión. La reconstrucción que se propone valida un principio irrestricto, del que se sigue que la verdad requiere la existencia de un determinado tipo de “demostración”. El artículo muestra que este principio no implica las instancias problemáticas del original principio irrestricto de la cognoscibilidad realizable, y que la concepción general que subyace al nuevo principio todavía tiene consecuencias epistémicas irrestrictas. Apelando precisamente a la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo argumenta además, en contra de la semántica BHK, a favor del carácter no constructivo de las demostraciones que contempla el anti-realismo semántico, y defiende que, en ese marco, uno de los argumentos más naturales a favor de una revisión a grandes rasgos intuicionista de la lógica clásica pierde toda su fuerza.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI 10.1387/theoria.14668
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Truth Without Contra(di)Ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.

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Citations of this work BETA

No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental.Elia Zardini - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):462-492.

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