Topoi 34 (1):37-54 (2015)

Elia Zardini
Universidade de Lisboa
The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions without being transparent or naive; in some other such cases, truth does not fulfil the relevant expressive functions and other conceptual resources must be called upon. Thus, in different ways, all such cases belie the quasi-deflationist argument’s insistence that naivety and transparency should be unrestrictedly valid for truth unrestrictedly to fulfil the relevant expressive functions. There might however be other reasons for solving the semantic paradoxes by revising classical logic, and the paper in effect closes by offering versions of the liar paradox that rely on compelling but opacity-friendly truth-theoretic principles
Keywords Context dependence  Deflationism  Naivety  Semantic paradoxes  Transparency  Truth  Truth-bearers  Truth-value gaps
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-014-9268-1
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Time and Modality.A. N. PRIOR - 1955 - Greenwood Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties.Elia Zardini - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):351-384.
Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
Instability and Contraction: Méditations Hégéliennes I.Elia Zardini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):155-188.
Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.

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