Anscombe and the Metaphysics of Human Action

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):249-262 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In “Causality and Determination,” Anscombe rejects the two received opinions on the nature of causality in the modern philosophical tradition. She rejects the Humean conception of universal generalization based on the constant conjunction in experience of cause and effect, and she also rejects the notion that causality entails a necessary connection between cause and effect. As an alternative, she suggests that the core notion of causality is one of the derivativeness of the effect from the cause. Her consideration of causality ranges generally over all types of causality, but I believe that the most significant implication of her position is in application to the causality of human action. In this paper, I will articulate what I take to be that position.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,297

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Anscombe and the Metaphysics of Human Action in advance.John Zeis - forthcoming - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
Why “Why?”? Action, Reasons and Language.Roger Teichmann - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):115-132.
Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening.Thor Grünbaum - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):41-67.
Interpreting Anscombe’s Intention §32FF.Anne Newstead - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:157-176.
Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'.John Schwenkler - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
Elizabeth Anscombe and the New Natural Lawyers on Intentional Action.Matthew B. O'Brien - 2013 - National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (1):47-56.
Human Life, Action and Ethics.G. E. M. Anscombe, Mary Geach & Luke Gormally - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):442-446.
Knowing Achievements.Alexander Stathopoulos - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (3):361-374.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-13

Downloads
23 (#501,990)

6 months
3 (#225,816)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Zeis
Canisius College

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references