Completing Kornblith’s Project

International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):67-90 (2003)
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Abstract

In his Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Hilary Kornblith presents an argument for the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible, but radically incomplete. In the development of this position, Kornblith relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical position entailed by his proposed solution to the problem is a thoroughgoing, realistic, scientific materialism. I will argue that the brand of realism that Kornblith’s solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive materialism that he espouses. Although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solution to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible

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John Zeis
Canisius College

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References found in this work

New reasons for realism.James J. Gibson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):162 - 172.
What Realism Implies and What it Does Not.Richard Boyd - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.

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