British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):527-532 (1987)
Rescher has presented a proof that a completed science is logically impossible; not every truth can be known. I show that the proof is valid only if it is read de re. One of its premises, however, is an obvious truth only on a de dicto reading; read de re it is false. What the proof shows, therefore, is that science has no limits and any true proposition can be known. We can, however, know it only in the meagre de re, and not in the informationally rich de dicto, sense of 'know'
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