Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):207 - 218 (1974)

I defend a slightly modified version of geach's rule r, I.E., That although both a and b are g, It is possible for a to be the same f as b and a different h than b, Provided that the question whether a and b are the same g is undecidable. Answering those who object to relative identity I claim that they tacitly adhere to a false fregean view, I.E., That one cannot use a singular term to denote an entity x if it is not true that for every y, X=y or not x=y. I show, However, That such terms are, And must be, Used by every empirically oriented language with finite or infinite predicative arsenal, And hence relative identity is more handy than absolute identity. Finally I give a version of leibniz's law for relative identity
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DOI 10.1007/BF00398879
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Relative Identity.Harry Deutsch - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity.Michael C. Rea - 2003 - Philosophia Christi 5 (2):431 - 445.
Relativizing Identity.Daniel Molto - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):260-269.

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