Knowledge Attributions and Relevant Epistemic Standards

In Recanati François, Stojanovic Isidora & Villanueva Neftali (eds.), Context Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter (2010)
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Abstract

The paper is concerned with the semantics of knowledge attributions(K-claims, for short) and proposes a position holding that K-claims are contextsensitive that differs from extant views on the market. First I lay down the data a semantic theory for K-claims needs to explain. Next I present and assess three views purporting to give the semantics for K-claims: contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and relativism. All three views are found wanting with respect to their accounting for the data. I then propose a hybrid view according to which the relevant epistemic standards for evaluating K-claims are neither those at the context of the subject (subject-sensitive invariantism), nor those at the context of the assessor (relativism), but it is itself an open matter. However, given that we need a principled way of deciding which epistemic standards are the relevant ones, I provide a principle according to which the relevant standards are those that are the highest between those at the context of the subject and those at the context of the assessor/attributor. In the end I consider some objections to the view and offer some answers.

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Dan Zeman
University of Warsaw

Citations of this work

Epistemický kontextualizmus a jeho motivácia.Marián Zouhar - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):171-186.

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