A defence of the conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem” for coincident objects

Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 16:41-60 (2020)
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Abstract

I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem”, I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because it denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary.Daniel Z. Korman - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Identity of Indiscernibles.Max Black - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):153-164.

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