Making sense of the ‘is’ of constitution

Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 361 (1) (2021)
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I consider a problem that arises in connection with cases of coincident objects and that affects the two main accounts that have been given of such cases, namely, Pluralism and Monism. The problem is that both views seem committed to accepting strained interpretations of some of the statements used to describe the situation. I consider Pickel’s arguments against the Pluralist’s strategy of interpreting ‘is’ as expressing constitution in sentences such as ‘The statue is the lump of clay’, and provide reasons for rejecting them—so as to vindicate, eventually, the Pluralist position.



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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
On Referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

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