Authors
Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we exploit to achieve non-omniscience focuses on topic- or subject matter-sensitivity: a feature of belief states which is gaining growing attention in the recent literature.
Keywords Belief revision  Conditional belief  Dynamic Epistemic Logic  Logical omniscience  Subject Matter  Aboutness  Hyperintensionality
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DOI 10.1017/s1755020319000686
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References found in this work BETA

Angellic Content.Kit Fine - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):199-226.
Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.
Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.

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