Abstract

Recent research indicates that environmentally responsible stakeholders’ green needs and practices effectively enhance substantive or symbolic corporate environmental responsibility. However, few studies have noted the potential for these green needs and practices to backfire. We integrate moral licensing theory and upper echelons theory to develop a theoretical framework. This framework can predict the differential effects of stakeholders’ green needs on corporate green innovation, contingent on the moral credits that these needs confer upon executives. The evidence comes from the practice of green bond issuance by listed firms and a quasi-natural experiment of China’s environmental tax policy. We find that a 1% increase in the regional environmental protection tax is associated with a 0.036% decrease in a firm’s green innovation. Conversely, a 1% increase in green bond issuance corresponds to a 0.020% increase in a firm’s green innovation. Moreover, these effects are enhanced when managerial discretion is high and mitigated in firms with prosocial executives. Our findings suggest that executives engage in moral mental accounting/balancing, and thus treat stakeholders’ green needs differently.