Abstract
The correspondence of a sensory object to the category of a descriptive statement requires a reflexive-identity of the object, and such a reflexive-identity is primarily based on the cognition of spatiality. Spatiality is, however, constituted through visual perception. There are only two occasions on which definitive reflexive-identity is exemplified: the infinitesimal point and the infinite “One,” and others are just human stipulations that meet pragmatic needs of rough identification of things at hand. However, if a spatial point is not different from any so-called “other” spatial point, to validate the reflexive identity of any spatial point implies a validation of the reflexive identity of all spatial points. Thus, as “one” and “many” here become absolutely unitary, the infinitely small and the infinitely immense are identical.
Keywords vision-centrality  reflexive-identity  phenomenology  perception  spatiality  视觉中心  自返同一性  现象学  知觉  空间
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DOI 10.1007/s11466-008-0004-z
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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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