Abstract

Reductionism about testimony has become less popular as philosophers have uncovered our epistemic dependence on others. Meanwhile, both non-reductionism and the interpersonal view face a challenge from gullibility. Surprisingly, the concept of gullibility has not been sustainedly examined. The primary goal in this paper is to propose an analysis of gullibility. After some introductory remarks, we begin this paper by discussing an account of gullibility in terms of insensitivity to defeaters. We argue that this account cannot accommodate cases where agents are gullible. We, therefore, offer a dispositional account of gullibility. In so doing, we show how gullibility differs from other epistemic vices vis-à-vis its interpersonal features. We also discuss how treating gullibility as an intellectual vice has salient implications for the debate between reductionists and non-reductionists about gullibility.