Husserl Studies 35 (3):249-263 (2019)

Pirui Zheng
Nankai University
Whether Husserl is a conceptualist has been heatedly debated among contemporary Husserl scholars. The present article intends to join the debate by asking the question of how, in the Husserlian context, intuitive acts fulfill signitive ones. On the one hand, those who take Husserl to be a conceptualist hold the content-identity theory, arguing that intuitive act and signitive act have the same content, so that the former can fulfill the latter. On the other hand, the non-conceptualists defend the object-identity theory and claim that it is the identity of object of intuitive and signitive act that makes fulfillment possible. On the basis of a careful reading of the sixth investigation of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the article proposes a dynamic content-identity theory, in which the identity of content does not mean that intuitive act and signitive act have the identical content accidentally, but rather, in the dynamic fulfillment process, the intuitive act obtains the content that overflows into it from the signitive act, so that the two acts have the identical content. And this article shows how the dynamic content-identity theory places Husserl in the conceptualist camp while avoiding certain difficulties of either plain content-identity theory or object-identity theory.
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DOI 10.1007/s10743-019-09247-5
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.
Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content.Bill Brewer - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Perception.Kevin Mulligan - 1995 - In David Woodruff Smith & Barry Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Confidence: A Husserlian Take.Kristjan Laasik - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.

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