Probability logic of finitely additive beliefs

Probability logics have been an active topic of investigation of beliefs in type spaces in game theoretical economics. Beliefs are expressed as subjective probability measures. Savage’s postulates in decision theory imply that subjective probability measures are not necessarily countably additive but finitely additive. In this paper, we formulate a probability logic Σ + that is strongly complete with respect to this class of type spaces with finitely additive probability measures, i.e. a set of formulas is consistent in Σ + iff it is satisfied in a finitely additive type space. Although we can characterize Σ + -theories satisfiable in the class as maximally consistent sets of formulas, we prove that any canonical model of maximally consistent sets is not universal in the class of type spaces with finitely additive measures, and, moreover, it is not a type space. At the end of this paper, we show that even a minimal use of probability indices causes the failure of compactness in probability logics.
Keywords Probabilistic beliefs  Type spaces  Reasoning about probabilities  Modal logic
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DOI 10.1007/s10849-009-9100-2
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References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability.J. Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence.Colin Howson - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):1-23.

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How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?Andow James - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):515-538.

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