Authors |
|
Abstract |
In this thesis, I argue that many identification intuitions, such as one that helps you identify the authorship of a painting you are seeing for the first time, fall under the class of experience-based intuitions. Such identification intuitions cannot arise without intuition generating systems that are shaped by experiences accumulated during one’s life. On my view, experience-based intuitions are produced by domain-general learning systems of hierarchical abstraction which may be modeled by deep convolutional neural networks. Owing to the mechanism of such IGSs, the reliability of experience-based intuition X depends on the quality of the experiences underlying the IGS which produces X. Lastly, I suggest that insofar as some philosophical thought experiments elicit experience-based identification intuitions, we can use the case method to glean information about our experiences as well as uncover certain conceptual commitments.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories |
No categories specified (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 201-240.
Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought.Pascal Boyer - 2001 - Basic Books.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
View all 29 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
From Experience to Metaphysics: On Experience‐Based Intuitions and Their Role in Metaphysics.Jiri Benovsky - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):684-697.
What Do Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really Tell Us About Hedonism?Sharon Hewitt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.
Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.
Why Don’T Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?James Andow - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):257-269.
Experience Machines, Conflicting Intuitions and the Bipartite Characterization of Well-Being.Chad M. Stevenson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):383-398.
Moral Learning, Rationality, and the Unreliability of Affect.Adam Gjesdal - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):460-473.
Beyond Transparency: The Spatial Argument for Experiential Externalism.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.
Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-09-11
Total views
12 ( #805,610 of 2,498,166 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,816 of 2,498,166 )
2019-09-11
Total views
12 ( #805,610 of 2,498,166 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,816 of 2,498,166 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads