Intentions are mental states

Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242 (2006)
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Abstract

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.

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On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Action, Intention, and Reason.Robert Audi - 2019 - Cornell University Press.

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