Intentions are mental states

Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242 (2006)
Abstract
Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790600641954
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Action, Intention, and Reason.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
On the Principle of Intention Agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.

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