Intentions are mental states
Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242 (2006)
Abstract
Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.Author Profiles
DOI
10.1080/13869790600641954
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Citations of this work
References found in this work
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
