Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111 (2016)

Authors
Paweł J. Zięba
Jagiellonian University
Abstract
This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.
Keywords disjunctivism  perception  epistemic justification
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DOI 10.18276/aie.2016.35-05
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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