Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge

In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 301-303 (2017)
Authors
Paweł J. Zięba
Jagiellonian University
Abstract
It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception.
Keywords unconscious perception  perception  perceptual justification  epistemic luck  perceptual knowledge  naïve realism  epistemological disjunctivism
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