A Conflict in Common Sense Moral Psychology

Utilitas 21 (4):401-423 (2009)
Abstract
Ordinary moral thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly act against the weight of reasons.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820809990197
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