Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379 (2006)

Authors
Aaron Zimmerman
University of California at Santa Barbara
Abstract
Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke’s own account of self-knowledge.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7797-y
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The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.
Introspection and Inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.

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