Evaluatively incomplete states of affairs

Philosophical Studies 43 (2):211 - 224 (1983)
The main point of this paper has been to show that the concept of evaluative incompleteness deserves consideration. In addition, I have suggested that it is plausible to accept that certain states of affairs in fact are evaluatively incomplete. But I have not sought to prove that this is so; indeed, I do not know how such proof might be given. Just which states of affairs, if any, are evaluatively incomplete is an extremely vexed question, and it is not one to which I have attempted to supply any systematic answer. My aim has been merely to point out that it is arguable that certain states of affairs are evaluatively incomplete — a fact that ought not to be overlooked due to an unquestioning acceptance of (II) and a fact which, certainly, ought not to be ruled out by fiat due to an adherence to definitions and assumptions which imply that (II) is false
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372384
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
G. E. Moore (1966). Ethics. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kris McDaniel (2014). A Moorean View of the Value of Lives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46.

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