Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019)
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Abstract

Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic

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Michael Zimmerman
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

Citations of this work

Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?Andrew Y. Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):1–17.
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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1861 - Cleveland: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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