Abstract

Kant’s repeated statement in the Critique of Pure Reason that the so-called table of judgements and, as a consequence, the table of pure concepts of the understanding or categories, is fully exhaustive is well-known. This ambitious assertion has worried and challenged generations of authors. However, thus far the entire discussion has completely disregarded the fact that in his Critique of Practical Reason Kant undertakes a coordinate venture. For the “Table of the Categories of Freedom”, which he sets out, with only a few explanations, in the “Second Chapter” of the Critique, Kant makes, when looked at more closely, the very same claim to completeness. This article shows that this same claim is made, even though Kant does not state this assertion as explicitly as one might have expected. And it poses the question, which underlying, yet concealed assumptions this view might appeal to. Or is it that Kant has merely failed to provide the evidence in this case?