Ethics 97 (2):374-386 (1987)

The following argument is addressed: (1) a person is morally responsible for an event's occurring only if that event's occurring was not a matter of luck; (2) no event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck; therefore, (3) no event is such that someone is morally responsible for its occurring. Two notions of control are distinguished: restricted and complete. (2) is shown false on the first interpretation, (1) on the second. The discussion involves a distinction between resultant and situational luck, And it is argued that, Even when luck's role in life, And the unfairness that stems from it, Is acknowledged, Moral responsibility remains possible
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/292845
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Nagel, Williams and moral luck.Judith Andre - 1983 - Analysis 43 (4):202.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.

View all 70 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Responsibility, Desert, and Justice.Carl Knight - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
Agency and Luck.Joseph Raz - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa.
Hurley on Justice and Responsibility. [REVIEW]Peter Vallentyne - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):433 - 438.
Moral Luck and the Law.David Enoch - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
Moral Luck and Computer Ethics: Gauguin in Cyberspace. [REVIEW]David Sanford Horner - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):299-312.


Added to PP index

Total views
390 ( #26,784 of 2,533,629 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #64,390 of 2,533,629 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes