Mind-Body Dualism

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):181 - 199 (2011)

Abstract

I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of 'garden variety' material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the 'speculative materialism' that is available to a substance materialist property dualist who abandons the identification of persons with such garden variety objects is significantly more attractive than Zimmerman allows. Although I do not attempt to refute its substance dualist rival, I conclude that the combination of property dualism with substance materialism can withstand Zimmerman's objections

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Author Profiles

Penelope Mackie
Nottingham University
Dean Zimmerman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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Citations of this work

Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1149-1165.
The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.

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