Persistence and presentism

Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126 (1996)
The ‘friends of temporal parts’ and their opponents disagree about how things persist through time. The former, who hold what is sometimes called a ‘4D’ theory of persistence, typically claim that all objects that last for any period of time are spread out through time in the same way that spatially extended objects are spread out through space — a different part for each region that the object fills. David Lewis calls this manner of persisting ‘perdurance’. The opposing, ‘3D’ theory has it that at least some objects do not persist in this manner; they ‘endure’ through time by ‘being wholly present at more than one time’.1 A related dispute pits ‘presentists’ against ‘non-presentists’. Presentists hold that the only things that really exist are those that exist now, at the present moment; and nonpresentists believe in something like a ‘block-universe’ in which non-simultaneous objects and events nevertheless co-exist (in a tenseless or non-temporal sense). Of late, the relations between these four positions have come under considerable scrutiny.2 As Ned Markosian has pointed out, it would be surprising if commitment to a perdurance or endurance theory of persistence automatically foreclosed one’s options in the presentism—non-presentism debate. But, says Markosian, that is just what the standard formulations of the perdurance and endurance theories imply.3 David Lewis has set the terms of the debate; in his usage, someone who thinks that all persisting objects endure would be said to hold the following.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568649609506542
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,208
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
What is Presentism?Daniel Deasy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4).
Defining Existence Presentism.Jonathan Tallant - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):479-501.
Essence Facts and Explanation.Chris Tillman - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):190-195.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

257 ( #13,240 of 2,172,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #28,436 of 2,172,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums