Synthese 149 (1):59-75 (2006)
Burge follows Descartes in claiming that the category of conceptually self-verifying judgments includes (but is not restricted to) judgments that give rise to sincere assertions of sentences of the form, 'I am thinking that p'. In this paper I argue that Burge’s Cartesian insight is hard to reconcile with Fregean accounts of the content of thought. Burge's intuitively compelling claim that cogito judgments are conceptually self-verifying poses a real challenge to neo-Fregean theories of content.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
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