Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352 (2008)
Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.
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References found in this work BETA
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard A. Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
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