The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'

Dialectica 59 (4):401–457 (2005)
Abstract
The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name “taking tense seriously”; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called “tensed theories of time”). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an “eternalist” version of the A-theory collapses into merely “taking tense seriously” — a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable eternalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01041.x
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References found in this work BETA
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Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Inconsistency in the A-Theory.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 247.
Experience and the Passage of Time.Bradford Skow - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
Philosophical Arguments Against the A-Theory.Daniel Deasy - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).

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