Making a case for introspection

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):163-164 (2009)
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Abstract

Defending first-person introspective access to own mental states, we argue against Carruthers' claim of mindreading being prior to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we understand our own and others' mental states. We conclude that a model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of access for self and other is sufficient and more consistent with the evidence

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Author Profiles

Sanne Weigner-Lodahl
University of Aarhus
Alexandra Zinck
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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The development of conscious control in childhood.Philip David Zelazo - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):12-17.

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