Retention of indexical belief and the notion of psychological continuity

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):608-623 (2011)
Abstract
A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one--many or many--one relation. This belief is unfounded. A notion of psychological continuity expresses a one--many or many--one relation only if it includes, as a constituent, psychological properties whose relation with their bearers is one--many or many--one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state and its bearer when first tokened is not a one--many or many--one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take a one--many or many--one form. This conclusion casts doubt on the Lockean approach to the issue, by showing that the notion of psychological continuity Lockeans rely on may not be available
Keywords indexical belief  demonstrative concepts  psychological continuity  personal identity  retention of indexical belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.679.x
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