The perspectival nature of probability and inference

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):353 – 358 (2000)
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Abstract

It is argued that two observers with the same information may rightly disagree about the probability of an event that they are both observing. This is a correct way of describing the view of a lottery outcome from the perspective of a winner and from the perspective of an observer not connected with the winner - the outcome is improbable for the winner and not improbable for the unconnected observer. This claim is both argued for and extended by developing a case in which a probabilistic inference is supported for one observer and not for another, though they relevantly differ only in perspective, not in any information that they have. It is pointed out, finally, that all probabilities are in this way dependent on perspective.

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Arnold Zuboff
University College London

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References found in this work

One self: The logic of experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.
Observer‐relative chances and the doomsday argument.John Leslie - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):427 – 436.

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