Dissertatio 44:187-211 (2016)

Breno Andrade Zuppolini
Universidade Federal de São Paulo
For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to demonstrable propositions. I shall argue that knowing first principles as such involves knowing them as explanatory of other scientific propositions. I shall then explain in which way noetic and demonstrative knowledge are in a sense interdependent cognitive states – even though νοῦς remains distinct from (and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge.
Keywords Aristotle  Foundationalism  science  Demonstration  Explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.15210/dissertatio.v44i0.9366
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Collected Papers.Charles S. Peirce - 1931 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Aristotle's First Principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):79-104.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Empirismo, conocimiento previo e inducción en Aristóteles, an. post. A 1.Fabián Mié - 2010 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 31 (2):243-284.
The Confusion Over Foundationalism.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1986 - Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
Aristotle on Explanation: Demonstrative Science and Scientific Inquiry.Kei Chiba - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)
Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):79-104.


Added to PP index

Total views
382 ( #27,047 of 2,520,893 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #37,781 of 2,520,893 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes