Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1987)
AbstractWhat happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
1575861925 0674458184 9781575861920
Similar books and articles
Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Planning and the stability of intention: A comment.Laura DeHelian & Edward F. McClennen - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (3):319-333.
Book Review:Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Michael E. Bratman. [REVIEW]Frederick Adams - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):198-.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.
Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
References found in this work
No references found.