Intention, plans, and practical reason

Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. [REVIEW]William J. Mohan - 1990 - International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):89-90.
Intentions, Plans, and Weakness of Will.Dylan Dodd - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):45-52.
Reasons and Intentions.Bruno Verbeek (ed.) - 2007 - Ashgate.
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Diachronic constraints of practical rationality.Luca Ferrero - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):144-164.
Shared intention and personal intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press. pp. 56-82.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
2,224 (#4,013)

6 months
176 (#19,039)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Bratman
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Value Capture.Christopher Nguyen - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (3).
Trust as an unquestioning attitude.C. Thi Nguyen - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7:214-244.

View all 740 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references