The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'

Dialectica 59 (4):401–457 (2005)

Authors
Dean Zimmerman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name “taking tense seriously”; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called “tensed theories of time”). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an “eternalist” version of the A-theory collapses into merely “taking tense seriously” — a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable eternalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01041.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,928
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

View all 119 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Inconsistency in the A-Theory.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 247.
The Intelligibility of Metaphysical Structure.Peter Finocchiaro - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):581-606.

View all 39 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A-Theory for B-Theorists.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.
Becoming Inflated.Craig Bourne - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):107-119.
Inconsistency in the A-Theory.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 247.
Time, Tense, and Causation.Michael Tooley - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold.Dean Zimmerman - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 163--246.
Leibniz's Non-Tensed Theory of Time.Michael J. Futch - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):125 – 139.
The Pervasive Paradox of Tense.Heather Dyke - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):103-124.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
485 ( #7,250 of 2,319,058 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #16,374 of 2,319,058 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature