Libertarianism is the social ideology that holds that interpersonal liberty should be universally observed. In particular, anarchy or at least minarchy should replace large states: the foremost violators of liberty. This is a dictionary of libertarian theory and argument. Like other subject dictionaries, it is not a dictionary of definitions; in fact, it is a popular misconception that even normal word dictionaries define words in any essential or stipulative way (they merely record usage). In this subject dictionary, the listed word, (...) phrase, or expression is sometimes simply assumed to be adequately understood so that discussion of any relevant libertarian issues can immediately begin. However, there is often clarification of the sense in which a word is being discussed, especially if there are various senses of the word that are best distinguished and maybe not all are relevant, or if there is some common confusion or ignorance about a word. There is even mention of etymology where this seems relevant or simply interesting. Despite its title, this is a sort of dictionary of politics—or, rather, anti-politics. But it does not attempt to give all the basic background information for each entry. Standard dictionaries and encyclopaedias of politics already fulfil that role. Nor does this work attempt to give equal weight to all libertarian anti-statist views. It is, as the subtitle indicates, more of a particular theory of libertarianism in an alphabetical format for the purpose of ensuring relative comprehensiveness and ease of reference. Therefore, entries have been chosen insofar as they help to comprise such a theory. The intended readership is anyone with an interest in social and political matters. Specialist knowledge is not presupposed; however, in order to minimise repetition throughout, the reader might sometimes need to pursue the cross references for elucidation or amplification. The collective entries include an explanation of libertarian anarchy: the theory that all state activity is an unnecessary evil; the greatest moral evil and source of destruction that blights human life. Libertarian property rights are preferable in every area of life: giving everyone more liberty and better outcomes as well. Many questions and objections might immediately spring to mind for those people who take politics for granted: enquire within. Entries combining such collective breadth and individual brevity are hardly intended to be the last word on any of the matters discussed. Some of them might, however, be sufficient to stimulate further thought and study. One cannot always live up to Nietzsche’s ambition—as quoted on the title page—but it appears to be a useful aim in this context. Many of these things need to be said, and it would be impracticable to write a book or even a scholarly article on each one. It is not necessary to agree with everything in order to agree with anything. There will be many ideas that non-libertarians will accept and many that libertarians will reject. The whole thing has been written and revised over many years. Omissions, inconsistencies, and errors undoubtedly remain. It is an unfinishable project in the sense that it is not possible to achieve even a temporary reflective equilibrium over such a large and diverse area. But it is necessary to stop at some point. Entries on people have been avoided, as these are not needed for the anarcho-libertarian theory and for reasons of space. There are a handful of notable military conflicts where some account of a libertarian approach to these events seems necessary to complete the outline of the general theory. It is not practical to include external references for all of the entries, but there are occasional ones. To facilitate the flow of the text, cross references are marked by small superscript asterisks immediately before relevant words, expressions, and phrases plus obvious variants of these words, including those with negating prefixes (rather than a prolix, pedantic, and parenthetical repetition of them exactly as they appear in entry titles). Mostly these asterisks only appear in each entry on the first example, but they are sometimes repeated in longer entries. I am indebted to the following people for their invaluable critical comments on varying and various portions of drafts of this work: David Barker, Stephen Berry, Paul Coulam, David Goldstone, David McDonagh, David Miller, Ray Percival, and David Ramsay Steele. I am particularly grateful to Mark Brady for his many scrupulous and comprehensive comments. All errors remain my responsibility. (shrink)

Libertarianism is the social ideology that holds that interpersonal liberty should be universally observed. In particular, anarchy or at least minarchy should replace large states: the foremost violators of liberty. This is a dictionary of libertarian theory and argument. Like other subject dictionaries, it is not a dictionary of definitions; in fact, it is a popular misconception that even normal word dictionaries define words in any essential or stipulative way (they merely record usage). In this subject dictionary, the listed word, (...) phrase, or expression is sometimes simply assumed to be adequately understood so that discussion of any relevant libertarian issues can immediately begin. However, there is often clarification of the sense in which a word is being discussed, especially if there are various senses of the word that are best distinguished and maybe not all are relevant, or if there is some common confusion or ignorance about a word. There is even mention of etymology where this seems relevant or simply interesting. Despite its title, this is a sort of dictionary of politics—or, rather, anti-politics. But it does not attempt to give all the basic background information for each entry. Standard dictionaries and encyclopaedias of politics already fulfil that role. Nor does this work attempt to give equal weight to all libertarian anti-statist views. It is, as the subtitle indicates, more of a particular theory of libertarianism in an alphabetical format for the purpose of ensuring relative comprehensiveness and ease of reference. Therefore, entries have been chosen insofar as they help to comprise such a theory. The intended readership is anyone with an interest in social and political matters. Specialist knowledge is not presupposed; however, in order to minimise repetition throughout, the reader might sometimes need to pursue the cross references for elucidation or amplification. The collective entries include an explanation of libertarian anarchy: the theory that all state activity is an unnecessary evil; the greatest moral evil and source of destruction that blights human life. Libertarian property rights are preferable in every area of life: giving everyone more liberty and better outcomes as well. Many questions and objections might immediately spring to mind for those people who take politics for granted: enquire within. Entries combining such collective breadth and individual brevity are hardly intended to be the last word on any of the matters discussed. Some of them might, however, be sufficient to stimulate further thought and study. One cannot always live up to Nietzsche’s ambition—as quoted on the title page—but it appears to be a useful aim in this context. Many of these things need to be said, and it would be impracticable to write a book or even a scholarly article on each one. It is not necessary to agree with everything in order to agree with anything. There will be many ideas that non-libertarians will accept and many that libertarians will reject. The whole thing has been written and revised over many years. Omissions, inconsistencies, and errors undoubtedly remain. It is an unfinishable project in the sense that it is not possible to achieve even a temporary reflective equilibrium over such a large and diverse area. But it is necessary to stop at some point. Entries on people have been avoided, as these are not needed for the anarcho-libertarian theory and for reasons of space. There are a handful of notable military conflicts where some account of a libertarian approach to these events seems necessary to complete the outline of the general theory. It is not practical to include external references for all of the entries, but there are occasional ones. To facilitate the flow of the text, cross references are marked by small superscript asterisks immediately before relevant words, expressions, and phrases plus obvious variants of these words, including those with negating prefixes (rather than a prolix, pedantic, and parenthetical repetition of them exactly as they appear in entry titles). Mostly these asterisks only appear in each entry on the first example, but they are sometimes repeated in longer entries. I am indebted to the following people for their invaluable critical comments on varying and various portions of drafts of this work: David Barker, Stephen Berry, Paul Coulam, David Goldstone, David McDonagh, David Miller, Ray Percival, and David Ramsay Steele. I am particularly grateful to Mark Brady for his many scrupulous and comprehensive comments. All errors remain my responsibility. (shrink)

The block universe theory of time is commonly said to be incompatible with temporal becoming. This confuses Maudlin who upholds both eternalism and passage. The aim of this paper is to answer Maudlin’s plea for clarification by distinguishing four degrees of temporal becoming. After discussing their respective compatibility with the block universe, I show that Maudlin asks much less from temporal becoming than most philosophers of time. Consequently, his form of becoming is compatible with the block universe, whereas the stronger (...) forms of becoming are not. (shrink)

The question to be entertained in this paper is the following: Are acids natural kinds? Do acids meet the criteria for being a natural kind, or are they merely "relevant kinds" to use Nelson Goodman’s terminology? Although acidity has been one of the oldest and most important concepts in chemistry, surprisingly little ink has been spilled on the natural kind question. I will approach the question from the perspective of microstructural essentialism.

According to Leininger, presentists and growing blockers cannot explain why past and present regularities persist in the future. In order to do so, they would have to appeal to enforcers, such as causation, laws or dispositions. But in a world with no future, these enforcers are powerless and cannot guarantee future regularity. I disagree and argue that Leininger’s coordination problem can be met by distinguishing type- from token-level necessitation. Whereas token-level necessitation is cross-temporal and subject to Leininger’s coordination problem, type-level (...) necessitation is atemporal and immune to the coordination problem. For this solution to work, though, type-level necessitation must be ontologically prior to token-level necessitation. This forces us to adopt a Platonist position according to which universals are transcendent, and not immanent. (shrink)

In ‘What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?’, Bernard Williams, self-consciously echoing J. L. Austin, suggests that philosophy might learn from tort law ‘the difference between practical reality and philosophical frivolity’. But while Austin regarded tort law as just another storehouse of concepts that stood the test of time, on a par with common sense as represented by a dictionary, Williams argues that ‘the use of certain ideas in the law does more to show that those ideas have strength (...) than is done by the mere fact that they are part of the currency of common sense’. But what does it mean to show that ideas or concepts ‘have strength’? How does conceptual strength relate to the distinction between practical reality and philosophical frivolity? And what special features of the law are supposed to make it a better test of conceptual strength than common sense? In this chapter, I reconstruct and develop Williams’s answers to these questions. I show why Williams believes that we need to test the concepts forming the currency of common sense against practical reality as embodied by legal practice; I identify six features of tort law that make it particularly suitable to act as such a test; I distinguish three respects in which concepts can show strength, and unpack Williams’s metaphor of microwave-resistant concepts: concepts capable of holding, structuring, and presenting material for intense critical scrutiny without falling prey to it themselves; and I show, finally, how philosophy can also learn to identify systematically weak concepts, or the limits of otherwise valuable concepts, by considering which concepts fail the test. (shrink)

In what follows, I will respond to three interrelated but distinct questions which collectively focus on whether the soul exerts causal influences upon the physical states or activities of the brain. Here are the three questions: -/- 1. If the soul is constantly acting upon the brain, then why don't we see physically uncaused spikes in the energy level of the brain? 2. Are the neurons in the brain sufficiently sensitive to respond to such tiny stimuli as would be within (...) the range of energy fluctuations permitted by the Uncertainty Principle? Is the brain responsive to quantum stimuli? 3. Would it be possible to show that the soul can affect the brain without our observing mysterious energy variations? (shrink)

This chapter discusses the fundamental question of the defense industry’s role and legitimacy for societies. It begins with a parable of a psychopath doing something self-serving that has beneficial moral consequences. Analogously, it is argued, the defense industry profiting by selling weapons that can kill people makes it useful in solving moral problems not solvable by people with ordinary moral scruples. Next, the chapter argues that while the defense industry is a business, it is also implicated in the security of (...) its home nations. In addition, its products can be used for good or evil. Thus, it must navigate conflicting values, with the result that the rules often thought to rightly regulate the industry—codes of business ethics, engineering ethics, procurement ethics, plus laws of the land, and dicta of conscience—need supplementing by general moral reflection. This chapter argues for a principle that tells how to decide when to violate the rules, for a theory of rational choice on which choosing by this principle is rational, and for teaching that theory to defense industry employees to ensure their ethical behavior. (shrink)

Written by interdisciplinary authors from the fields of educational policy, early childhood education, history, political philosophy, law, and moral philosophy, this volume addresses the use of disciplinary action across varied educational contexts. Much of the punishment of children occurs in non-criminal contexts, in educational and social settings, and schools are institutions where young people are subject to disciplinary practices and justifications that are quite unlike those found elsewhere. In addition to this, the discipline they receive is often discriminatory, being disproportionately (...) focused on students of colour and other minoritized identities, and unjust in other ways. This timely text is a comprehensive examination of punishment in schools, prompting discussions on racial equity, social justice in education and the school to prison pipeline. Each chapter offers empirically informed, theoretical investigations into punishment in educational settings, including how punishment is understood, whether it is permissible to discipline students, and whether such punishment can be considered educational. (shrink)

This book lists the manuscripts related to the 'De Auxiliis' Controversy that are preserved in Rome. This dispute is one of the episodes in Spanish intellectual history with the greatest international resonance, if we take into account the commotion caused in Rome and the secular repercussions it will have within the Catholic and even Protestant sphere. This theological controversy also involves highly topical concepts that attract the interest of contemporary philosophers. This book contains a complete list of the manuscripts preserved (...) in Rome, trying to relate them to each other and to point out which are the most reliable and valuable sources. This involves the description of a considerable number of manuscripts that had not been described in any catalogue until now, and the identification of some unknown works. In addition, several unpublished letters by Domingo Báñez and Luis de Molina are transcribed here. (shrink)

This book delivers philosophy’s first sustained examination of handedness: being left-handed, right-handed, etc. It engages literature from phenomenology and continental philosophy, analytic philosophy, laterality studies, cognitive science and psychology, gender studies and feminist philosophy, sociology, political science, and more to provide a systematic accounting of the nature of handedness, its basis in lived experience, its effects on bodily performance, its role in varieties of inequality, and its part in oppression and liberation. As a radical asymmetry in the body, handedness plays (...) a key role in human flourishing. It informs both personal bodily movement and social life, from handshakes and high fives to high tech tools made for one hand or the other. Moreover, with left-handers making up just 10% of the population, handedness presents a significant inequality in lived experience. To live and live well, we must understand handedness. (shrink)

Classical theists hold that God is omnipotent. But now suppose a critical atheologian were to ask: Can God create a stone so heavy that even he cannot lift it? This is the dilemma of the stone paradox. God either can or cannot create such a stone. Suppose that God can create it. Then there’s something he cannot do – namely, lift the stone. Suppose that God cannot create the stone. Then, again, there’s something he cannot do – namely, create it. (...) Either way, God cannot be omnipotent. Among the variety of known theological paradoxes, the paradox of the stone is especially troubling because of its logical purity. This Element purports to show that one cannot believe in both God and the laws of logic. In the face of the stone paradox, how should the contemporary analytic theist respond? Ought they to revise their belief in theology or their belief in logic? (shrink)

This paper looks first at the scope of religious experience, offering some representative examples of phenomena that typically give rise to spiritual experiences. This leads on a consideration of the phenomenology of such experiences – the particular way in which they present themselves to the conscious subject. Lastly, the paper tackles the vexed question of the source of such experiences, and suggests that this is best understood in terms of a (certain kind of) theistic framework.