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  1. Philosophy of Science.Jeff Kochan & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2011 - In Sebastian Luft & Søren Overgaard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology.
    This chapter briefly summarises work by four key figures in the phenomenological philosophy of science: Edmund Husserl; Martin Heidegger; Patrick Heelan; and Joseph J. Kockelmans. In addition, some comparison is made with well-known figures in mainstream philosophy of science, and suggestions are given for further readings in the phenomenological philosophy of science.
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  • Heidegger and Scientific Realism.Trish Glazebrook - 2001 - Continental Philosophy Review 34 (4):361-401.
    This paper describes Heidegger as a robust scientific realist, explains why his view has received such conflicting treatment, and concludes that the special significance of his position lies in his insistence upon linking the discussion of science to the question of its relation with technology. It shows that Heidegger, rather than accepting the usual forced option between realism and antirealism, advocates a realism in which he embeds the antirealist thesis that the idea of reality independent of human understanding is unintelligible. (...)
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  • Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247.
  • A Sociological Theory of Objectivity.David Bloor - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 17:229-245.
    The aim is to explain and defend the slogan that 'objectivity is social'. The sense of external reference of our common sense classifications and our moral and scientific beliefs derives from their having the character of social institutions. This claim provides a fruitful way of interpreting popper's doctrine of the 'third world' of objective knowledge. The implications of the sociological approach are explored with material drawn from the history of science and religion.
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  • Husserlian Phenomenology and Scientific Realism.Joseph Rouse - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):222-232.
    Husserl's (1970) discussion of "Galilean science" is often dismissed as naïvely instrumentalist and hostile to science. He has been explicitly criticized for misunderstanding idealization in science, for treating the lifeworld as a privileged conceptual framework, and for denying that science can in principle completely describe the world (because ordinary prescientific concepts are irreplaceable). I clarify Husserl's position concerning realism, and use this to show that the first two criticisms depend upon misinterpretations. The third criticism is well taken. Nevertheless, this is (...)
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  • Husserl's Later Philosophy of Natural Science.Patrick A. Heelan - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (3):368-390.
    Husserl argues in the Crisis that the prevalent tradition of positive science in his time had a philosophical core, called by him "Galilean science", that mistook the quest for objective theory with the quest for truth. Husserl is here referring to Gottingen science of the Golden Years. For Husserl, theory "grows" out of the "soil" of the prescientific, that is, pretheoretical, life-world. Scientific truth finally is to be sought not in theory but rather in the pragmatic-perceptual praxes of measurement. Husserl (...)
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  • Phenomenology and the History of Science.Jacob Klein - 1940 - In Marvin Farber & Edmund Husserl (eds.), Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl. Cambridge: Mass., Published for the University of Buffalo by the Harvard University Press. pp. 143--163.
  • A Sociological Theory of Objectivity1: David Bloor.David Bloor - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 17:229-245.
    I want to propose to you a theory about the nature of objectivity—a theory which will tell us something about its causes, its intrinsic character, and its sources of variation. The theory in question is very simple. Indeed, it is so simple that I fear you will reject it out of hand. Here is the theory: it is that objectivity is social. What I mean by saying that objectivity is social is that the impersonal and stable character that attaches to (...)
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