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Autoengaño Y evidencia

Manuscrito 41 (3):125-161 (2018)

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  1. When Are We Self-Deceived?Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This article’s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how self-deception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.
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  • Self-Deception, Action, and Will.Robert Audi - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):133-158.
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  • Finite Rational Self-Deceivers.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.
    I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is (...)
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  • An Analysis of Self-Deception.Kent Bach - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.
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  • The Myth of Self-Deception.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.
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  • The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human LIfe.Mark Alfino - 2014 - Journal of Information Ethics 23 (2):82-86.
  • The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.
    Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...)
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  • What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?Richard Holton - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
    The orthodox answer to my question is this: in a case of self-deception, the self acts to deceive itself. That is, the self is the author of its own deception. I want to explore an opposing idea here: that the self is rather the subject matter of the deception. That is, I want to explore the idea that self-deception is more concerned with the self’s deception about the self, than with the self’s deception by the self. The expression would thus (...)
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  • Self-Deception, Intentions and Contradictory Beliefs.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):309-319.
    Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.
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  • The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception.William von Hippel & Robert Trivers - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):1.
    In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. (...)
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  • Seeing Through Self-Deception.Annette Barnes - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterisation of other-deception and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the (...)
  • Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele.Robert Audi - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
    Mele's study of philosophical and psychological theories of self-deception informatively links the conceptual and dynamic aspects of self-deception and explicates it without positing mutually inconsistent beliefs, such as those occurring in two-person deception. It is argued, however, that he does not do full justice to the dissociation characteristic of self-deception and does not sufficiently distinguish self-deception from self-caused deception.
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  • Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric Delusions: On Robert Audi's Transition From Self-Deception to Delusion.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In M. Timmons, J. Greco & A. Mele (eds.), Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
    For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to each of the contributors in a way (...)
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  • Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2004 - Ratio 17 (3):294-311.
    The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic (...)
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  • Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Beliefs Under the Influence.Ariela Lazar - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):265-290.
    How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state (...)
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  • Wishful Thinking and Self-Deception.Bela Szabados - 1973 - Analysis 33 (June):201-205.
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  • Lying to Oneself.Raphael Demos - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (18):588-595.
  • Review of Irrationality. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):635-636.
  • Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264--296.
  • Self-Deception, Intentions, and Contradictory Beliefs.JosÉ Luis BermÚdez - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):309-319.
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  • Social Self-Deceptions.William Ruddick - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 380--389.
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  • What is Wrong with Self-Deception.Marcia Baron - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 431--449.
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  • Self-Deception, Religious Belief, and the False Belief Condition.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (6):1073-1074.