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  1. Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to Francisco Varela.Evan Thompson - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.
    This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis.
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  • The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality.Roberto Poli - 2001 - Axiomathes 12 (3-4):261-283.
  • The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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  • Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism.Dave Ward, David Silverman & Mario Villalobos - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):365-375.
    This introduction to a special issue of Topoi introduces and summarises the relationship between three main varieties of 'enactivist' theorising about the mind: 'autopoietic', 'sensorimotor', and 'radical' enactivism. It includes a brief discussion of the philosophical and cognitive scientific precursors to enactivist theories, and the relationship of enactivism to other trends in embodied cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
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  • Spatial Perception: The Perspectival Aspect of Perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12472.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending on (...)
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  • Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.
    The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind-body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind from instrumentalism and (...)
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  • Integrating Cognitive (Neuro)Science Using Mechanisms.Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):45-67.
    In this paper, an account of theoretical integration in cognitive (neuro)science from the mechanistic perspective is defended. It is argued that mechanistic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of constraints on representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of possible mechanisms, as previous accounts of integration had it. This way, integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of constraintsatisfaction account of coherence between scientific representations. In particular, the account has resources to talk of (...)
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  • Cross-Modal Associations Between Materic Painting and Classical Spanish Music.Liliana Albertazzi, Luisa Canal & Rocco Micciolo - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • When the World Becomes 'Too Real': A Bayesian Explanation of Autistic Perception.Elizabeth Pellicano & David Burr - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (10):504-510.
  • Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:4-25.
    There are several different questions associated with the study of folk psychology: what is the nature of our commonsense concepts of mental states?, how do we attribute mental states, to ourselves and to other people?, and how do we acquire our concepts and skills at mental-state attribution?Three general approaches to these questions are examined and assessed: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. A preliminary problem is to define each of these approaches. Alternative definitions are explored, centering on which questions (...)
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  • A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • A Mathematical Science of Qualities: A Sequel.Liliana Albertazzi & A. H. Louie - 2016 - Biological Theory 11 (4):192-206.
    Following a previous article published in Biological Theory, in this study we present a mathematical theory for a science of qualities as directly perceived by living organisms, and based on morphological patterns. We address a range of qualitative phenomena as observables of a psychological system seen as an impredicative system. The starting point of our study is the notion that perceptual phenomena are projections of underlying invariants, objects that remain unchanged when transformations of a certain class under consideration are applied. (...)
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  • Eye and Mind.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1964 - In The Primacy of Perception. Evanston, USA: Northwestern University Press. pp. 159-190.
     
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  • A Science of Qualities.Liliana Albertazzi - 2015 - Biological Theory 10 (3):188-199.
    The apparent dichotomy between qualitative versus quantitative dimensions in science intersects with the domain of several disciplines, as well as different research fields within one and the same discipline. The perception of qualitative as “poor quantitative,” however, is methodologically unsustainable, because there are perfectly rigorous ways to conduct qualitative research. A somehow different question is whether a science of qualities per se is possible: that is, whether a science of appearances can be devised, what its observables are, and its methodological (...)
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  • The Dual Coding of Colour.Rainer Mausfeld - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 381--430.
    The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of (...)
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  • Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology.Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  • A Computational Analysis of Colour Constancy.Donald Ia Macleod & Jürgen Golz - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  • Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and Consciousness.Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.
  • Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  • Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Synesthesia.Edward M. Hubbard & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran - 2005 - Neuron 48 (3):509-520.
  • Vision as Bayesian Inference: Analysis by Synthesis?Alan Yuille & Daniel Kersten - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (7):301-308.
  • Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
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  • The Epistemological Status of Vision and its Implications for Design.Dhanraj Vishwanath - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (3):399-486.
    Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual (...)
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  • Phenomenological Constraints: A Problem for Radical Enactivism.Michael Roberts - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):375-399.
    This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely heavily upon (...)
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  • On the Brain-Basis of Visual Consciousness: A Sensorimotor Account.Alva Noë & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press. pp. 567--598.
  • Is Experience Ubiquitous?David J. Chalmers - 1996 - In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
     
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  • Peer Commentary and Responses 307.Francisco Varela & Jonathan Shear - 1999 - In J. Shear & Francisco J. Varela (eds.), The View From Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic. pp. 6--2.
     
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  • Experiences Are Objects. Towards a Mind-Object Identity Theory.Riccardo Manzotti - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):16-36.
    : Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural (...)
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  • On the Psychophysical Law.S. S. Stevens - 1957 - Psychological Review 64 (3):153-181.
  • Into the Neural Maze.Donald Ia Macleod - 2010 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press.
    This chapter surveys a few of the so-called “easy” problems, as referred to by Chalmers, in understanding color perception. The obscurity of psycho-neural isomorphism is highlighted by the difficulties encountered in the domain of color, and while this theme has been discussed extensively, the discussion here at least provides an opportunity to review interesting facts and ideas about color vision. Trichromacy is considered first in this chapter, since it provides the most familiar example of physiological explanation in perception—an explanation generally (...)
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  • Gestalt Theory,[Über Gestalttheorie], an Address Before the Kant Society, Berlin, 7th December 1924'.Max Wertheimer - 1938 - In Willis D. Ellis (ed.), Source Book of Gestalt Psychology. Harcourt, Brace and Co.
     
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  • Naturalizing the Mind in a Quantum Framework.Basil J. Hiley & Paavo Pylkkanen - 2001 - In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
  • The Brain's Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in Conceptual Knowledge.Vittorio Gallese & George Lakoff - unknown
    Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts—even concepts about action and perception—are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain’s sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about (...)
     
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  • Towards Robot Conscious Perception.Antonio Chella - 2007 - In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. pp. 124-140.