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  1. Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets.James W. McAllister - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (2):217-228.
    Bogen and Woodward claim that the function of scientific theories is to account for 'phenomena', which they describe both as investigator-independent constituents of the world and as corresponding to patterns in data sets. I argue that, if phenomena are considered to correspond to patterns in data, it is inadmissible to regard them as investigator-independent entities. Bogen and Woodward's account of phenomena is thus incoherent. I offer an alternative account, according to which phenomena are investigator-relative entities. All the infinitely many patterns (...)
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  • Data and Phenomena.Jim Woodward - 1989 - Synthese 79 (3):393 - 472.
  • Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account.James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):1–24.
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  • Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. [REVIEW]Bruce Glymour - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):29-37.
    Bogen and Woodward (1988) advance adistinction between data and phenomena. Roughly, theformer are the observations reported by experimentalscientists, the latter are objective, stable featuresof the world to which scientists infer based onpatterns in reliable data. While phenomena areexplained by theories, data are not, and so theempirical basis for an inference to a theory consistsin claims about phenomena. McAllister (1997) hasrecently offered a critique of their version of thisdistinction, offering in its place a version on whichphenomena are theory laden, and hence (...)
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  • Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.Monton Bradley & Fraassen Bas C. Van - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term 'observable' has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and constructive empiricism require clarification in the face (...)
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  • The Scientific Image.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
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  • The Book of Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):740-743.
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  • The Book of Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
  • A Defence of van Fraassen’s Critique of Abductive Inference: Reply to Psillos.James Ladyman, Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Bas Fraassen - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):305-321.
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  • Data, Phenomena, and Reliability.Jim Woodward - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):179.
    This paper explores how data serve as evidence for phenomena. In contrast to standard philosophical models which invite us to think of evidential relationships as logical relationships, I argue that evidential relationships in the context of data-to-phenomena reasoning are empirical relationships that depend on holding the right sort of pattern of counterfactual dependence between the data and the conclusions investigators reach on the phenomena themselves.
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  • Observations, Theories and the Evolution of the Human Spirit.Jim Bogen & Jim Woodward - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):590-611.
    Standard philosophical discussions of theory-ladeness assume that observational evidence consists of perceptual outputs (or reports of such outputs) that are sentential or propositional in structure. Theory-ladeness is conceptualized as having to do with logical or semantical relationships between such outputs or reports and background theories held by observers. Using the recent debate between Fodor and Churchland as a point of departure, we propose an alternative picture in which much of what serves as evidence in science is not perceptual outputs or (...)
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  • Evading the Irs.James Bogen & Jim Woodward - 1993 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):233-268.
    'IRS' is our term for the logical empiricist idea that the best way to understand the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on scientific theories is to model it in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentences representing the evidence, and sentences representing hypotheses the evidence is used to evaluate. Developing ideas from our earlier work, including 'Saving the Phenomena'(Phil Review 97, 1988, p.303-52 )we argue that the bearing of observational evidence on theory depends upon causal connections and error characteristics of the (...)
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  • Saving the Phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.
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  • To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory From Plato to Galileo.Pierre Duhem, Edmund Doland & Chaninah Maschler - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (174):344-346.
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  • Die Rettung der Phänomene Ursprung Und Geschichte Eines Antiken Forschungsprinzips.Jürgen Mittelstrass - 1962 - De Gruyter.
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  • A Defence of Van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Inference: Reply to Psillos.Ladyman James, Douven Igor, Horsten Leon & Fraassen Bas van - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):305 - 321.
    Psillos has recently argued that van Fraassen’s arguments against abduction fail. Moreover, he claimed that, if successful, these arguments would equally undermine van Fraassen’s own constructive empiricism, for, Psillos thinks, it is only by appeal to abduction that constructive empiricism can be saved from issuing in a bald scepticism. We show that Psillos’ criticisms are misguided, and that they are mostly based on misinterpretations of van Fraassen’s arguments. Furthermore, we argue that Psillos’ arguments for his claim that constructive empiricism itself (...)
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  • Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress.Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes & Alfred Tarski - 1962 - Stanford University Press.
  • To Save the Phenomena, an Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory From Plato to Galileo.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1969 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.